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THE CONCEPT OF Ilo.pa6Eiyµo. IN PLATO'S THEORY OF FORMS

It is essential in any treatment of Plato's Theory of Forms to determine what sort of
thing a Form is supposed to be. Much recent discussion of the Theory has been
characterized by the assumption that Forms are exemplars: models or perfect instances of the property, relation, or kind for which they are named. 1 There seem to
be two main reasons for holding this view. First, scholars have assumed that Plato
regarded his Forms as self-predicative, as having the property for which they were
named. 2 Second, they have assumed that Plato must mean that Forms are exemplars
when he refers to them as "paradeigmata," i.e. "paradigms." 3
There has been a good deal of discussion of the claim that Platonic Forms are
self-predicative, the result of which seems to be that the claim at present must be
regarded as not proven.• In this paper, I wish to address the other claim, that Plato's
assertion that the Forms are paradigms commits him to the view that they are exemplars. In section I, I shall argue that the well-known weaknesses of this interpretation, and its incompatibility with Plato's own statements about the Forms, should
lead us to reject it. In section II, I shall distinguish two senses of "paradeigma," and
examine those passages in which the term is used in connection with the Forms, in
order to determine which sense fits the text best. In section III, I shall discuss the
relative merits of the interpretation given in section II and the exemplar view.

I
The interpretation of the Forms as exemplars has certain advantages that make it attractive to Plato scholars. It provides a straightforward analysis of those otherwise
strange statements of Plato that ''The Form of Fis itself F'': an exemplar of°some
property, F, would be F by virtue of having the property. Thus, the exemplar view
provides a basis for the doctrine of self-predication. The exemplar view also provides a basis for Plato's claim that the participants in a Form resemble, imitate, or
reflect that Form. On the view we are now considering, this means simply that the
participants possess, in a derivative way, the same property the Form has in a preeminent or underived way. This view also provides an explanation of the causal role
of the Forms: the Form of F makes the many F-things F by imparting to them the
property of being F, which it possesses pre-eminently. As the sun makes things hot
by imparting some of the heat which it possesses, so, on this view, the Form of
Tallness makes things tall by imparting some of its own tallness to them.
In spite of these strengths, however, the exemplar view contains fatal
weaknesses. These stem from the fact that, if every Form is an exemplar of its appropriate property, and some properties can only be attributed to particular, or to
sensible things, then the Forms of those properties, at least, must be particulars, or
sensibles, themselves. The Form of Animal, for instance, would have to be an
animal, the Form of Bed a bed, the form of Green a green thing. 5
This implication is not always explicitly drawn, perhaps because it is embarrassing. When it is drawn, it is often used in making a case for a change in Plato's views:
early in his life, it is urged, Plato may have held such a position on the nature of the
Forms; but later he abandoned or modified that view. This position runs afoul of
the evidence of the text, however, as I shall show.
The problems with the exemplar view are numerous. Perhaps the most serious
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objection to it is that it works at most for some of Plato's Forms. As Strawson
pointed out:
The analogy [with particulars], in the case of such things as musical
compositions, motor-car types, flag types, etc., is in fact peculiarly
rich. Indeed, one might say that an appropriate model for nonparticulars of these kinds is that of a model particular - a kind of
prototype, or ideal example, itself particular, which serves as a rule
or standard for the production of others. The Platonic model for
non-particulars in general - an ideal form of which the instances
are more or less exact or imperfect copies - is, in these cases, an
appropriate model, though it becomes absurdly inappropriate if
generalized to cover non-particulars at large. 6
To illustrate: Plato in his later dialogues pays close attention to the Forms of Unity,
Being, Sameness, and Difference. Yet it is impossible that any of these Forms should
be primarily exemplary in function, even though in these cases the Forms could
without absurdity exemplify the properties for which they are named. 1
Consider, for example, the Form of Being. If it is to be construed as the
paradigmatically, pre-eminently real, all of its participants must be derivatively real.
Yet all the other Forms, according to the Sophist, participate in Being, and all the
Forms are supposed to be equally real. The status of derivative or deficient reality is
reserved by Plato for the realm of Becoming. On the other hand, if all the Forms are
equally real, each of them could serve as an exemplar of Being as well as the Form of
Being, and there would be, on this score, no need for a distinct Form. The same
argument applies, mutatis mutandis, to the other Forms mentioned above.
There are other difficulties with the exemplar interpretation of the Forms as
well. Since the exemplar view entails self-predication, the Third Man Argument
would seem to be a strong argument against the Theory. If it could not be refuted or
evaded, then the conclusion that the Theory was incoherent would be inescapable. 8
Plato scholars have sometimes accepted, or even welcomed, this conclusion; yet a
view which leads to contradiction and which in any case suits Plato's purposes only
partially is not lightly to be attributed to such a great philosopher.
The objections stated so far are philosophical in nature; they point to limitations in the interpretation itself. Yet it is certainly possible for Plato to have held
such a view, in spite of its limitations. There is considerable textual evidence,
however, that is in fundamental conflict with the exemplar view.
In the Euthyphro (6d-e), in the Meno (72b ff.), and elsewhere, Socrates rejects
definition by example; he makes it clear that he is after a universal definition which
is capable of fitting every application of the term. Yet he also makes it clear in the
Euthyphro that the Forms are the objects of definition. If Forms were for Plato exemplars or paradigm instances of properties, they would seem to run afoul of his
own restrictions on definition.
Moreover, in the very same passages where Plato speaks of the Forms in selfpredicative terms, calls them paradigms, or asserts that they are models imitated by
their participants - in short, in the very places where he says things which give
credibility to the exemplar view - he also says things which are incompatible with
that view. He ascribes to Forms an inherent generality, or unity in multiplicity,
which a particular exemplar could not have. In the Euthyphro, Socrates asks:
Is not Holiness the same as itself in every action, and again is not
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Unholiness entirely opposite to Holiness and the same as itself; and
does not whatever is going to be unholy have a certain single Form
with respect to Unholiness?
(5c-d)
And:
Remember, then, that it was not this I asked of you, to teach me
one or two of the many holy things, but that very Form by virtue of
which all the holy things are holy; for you said that by one Form
the unholy things are unholy and the holy things holy.
(6d-e)
In these passages, the Form of Holiness is not an exemplar of holiness, but a property that is somehow common to or "in" holy actions. Yet it is in this last passage, immediately following the remarks quoted, that he refers to the Form as aparadeigma.
In the Symposium, Diotima presents the Form of Beauty as a separate entity,
beautiful in itself (i.e. self-predicative), and distinct from its various manifestations,
all of which suggest the exemplar view. Yet to apprehend the Form the lover of
beauty must be able to abstract from all particular manifestations of beauty; for
instance,
If he must pursue the beauty in sensible shape, it is great madness
not to believe that the beauty of every body is one and the same.
(210b)
In the Phaedo, after having described the Form of Equality as something equal,
which equal things resemble, and as something distinct from its instances (in the
same way as the Form of Beauty is described in the Symposium), he goes on to
describe the relation of Forms in general to their participants as one of immanence:
It appears that, not only those opposites do not receive one
another, but also whatever things are not opposite to one another,
but always have the opposites, these also are not likely to receive
that Form which is opposite to the one which is in them. 9
(104b; cf. 102b)
Thus, in the early and middle dialogues, where Plato manifestly treats Forms as
paradigms, and as entities separate and distinct from their participants, he also
treats them as immanent common characters. If "paradeigma" means "exemplar",
there is an irreconcilable conflict between the two claims, for an exemplar of a property or characteristic cannot be identical to the characteristic itself.
It cannot be argued that Plato offers both interpretations of the nature of the
Forms because he has failed to distinguish the universal character or property from
its particular instance. In the Euthyphro passages quoted above he makes the
the
distinction quite clearly; and in Republic X, 597a, he distinguishes o son KA.tVTI,
nva, some particular bed, which the
Form of Bed or what a bed is, from KAtVTIV
carpenter builds. 10 The clear contrast between the two makes it impossible to construe the Form of Bed as a particular bed, however ideal.
Nor is it possible to resolve the conflict by modifying the chronology of the
dialogues. The textual evidence indicates that Plato did not advance from a view according to which the Forms were simply paradigms to one in which they were simply
immanent characters, since both interpretations are present in the early and middle
dialogues. In order to argue that Plato advanced from the view of the early and middle dialogues that Forms were both paradigms and characters to a later view in
which paradeigmatism is abandoned, one must be able to prove that the Timaeus is
a middle-period dialogue, despite the stylometric evidence to the contrary; 11 that the
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Seventh Letter, which, like the Timaeus, represents the Forms as paradigms, is not
only inauthentic but also a misleading representation of Plato's later thought; and
that the echoes of paradeigmatism in the other later dialogues (e.g. at Philebus 62a,
which seems parallel to both the philosophical passage of the Seventh Letter and the
Divided Line passage in Republic VI) can be explained away. In view of the extensive debate on these issues since Owen's attempt to redate the Timaeus in 1953, it
seems unlikely that this solution can meet all the objections to it that have been raised.
In summation, then, the exemplar interpretation is philosophically inadequate
and introduces into the Platonic text a conflict between the claim that the Forms are
paradigms and the claim that they are common characters. This interpretive conflict
does not seem to be resolvable either by the assumption that Plato failed to
distinguish the two claims or by the assumption that he later abandoned one of
them. It seems desirable on all these counts to find another interpretation of Plato's
view that the Forms are paradigms, one which does not commit him to the claim that
Forms are exemplars.
II
The English word "paradigm", and the Greek cognate "paradeigma", have in fact
two distinct meanings. The primary meaning of both is "example" or "instance",
but both may also be used to mean "pattern". 12 These two senses are often conflated, in translations of Plato as well as in ordinary English, but the distinction between the two is straightforward. Examples exemplify or instantiate patterns. Examples are usually, but not necessarily, particulars (the species dog may serve as an
example of the genus animal, just as an individual dog may serve as an example of
the species); patterns, on the other hand, are inherently general (innumerable dishes,
floor tiles, etc., may exemplify one and the same pattern). Nothing prevents some
patterns from being instances of themselves (if there is some pattern exemplified by
all things which possess unity, for instance, it is presumably exemplified by the pattern, too); but this will not normally be the case (the pattern common to all
automobiles will not itself be an automobile, etc.).
Although the proponents of the exemplar view clearly take "paradeigma" to
mean "example", since they hold that Forms exemplify the properties for which
they are named, I hope to show that the sense of "pattern" fits better with Plato's
own use of the term in relation to the Forms. I shall also try to indicate (in Section
III) the general philosophical advantages to this interpretation.
Admittedly, Plato uses "paradeigma" in both senses I have distinguished, and
he does not explicitly take note of the difference between them. Even at Politicus
278c3 ff., where he gives a definition of "paradeigma," it is unclear whether a
paradigm is an example or the common feature between two otherwise dissimilar
cases. ' 3 There are passages, however, where he observes the distinction, even if he is
not explicitly aware of it. In some passages, the only correct translation of
"paradeigma" is "example"; in others, only "pattern" can serve. To cite just one
instance of each: at Laches 187a7, Nicias and Laches are asked for an example of
men whose characters they have improved, and it must be particular instances, individual men, that Socrates has in mind. At Protagoras 326c8, on the other hand,
the city compels its sons to live according to the laws as after a pattern. Since laws
are rules for good behavior but hardly examples of it, the sense of "example" cannot be correct for "paradeigma".
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In passages of the dialogues not directly concerned with the Theory of Forms,
"example" or "model" predominates over "pattern" as the correct translation of
"paradeigma"; but this is not the case in those passages where the Theory is under
discussion. These passages occur at Euphr. 6e; Rep. V, 472c, VI, 500e, VII, 540a,
IX, 592b; Tht. 176e; Parm. 132d; and Tim. 28a-c, 29b, 31a, 37c, 38b-c, 39e, and
48e-49a. In none of these passages are we compelled to translate "paradeigma" as
"exemplar"; some of them are neutral between the two senses I have distinguished,
and others require the translation "pattern".
Only one of the passages I have listed gives support to the exemplar view:
Parmenides 132d. Here Socrates claims that "these Forms are set up as
paradeigmata in nature''; from this Parmenides purports to deduce a version of the
Third Man regress. The regress depends on the resemblance between the Form and
its participants, and only on the exemplar view is it literally true that Form and participant resemble each other. Thus, if the argument is to go through, it would seem
that "paradeigmata" must mean "exemplars". Yet the fact that Parmenides so construes the word is far from unambiguous proof that it is correctly so construed. We
can insist on this as the correct translation of "paradeigmata" only if we are willing
to beg the question of the soundness of the Third Man Argument. Yet, given the obvious chicanery that goes on in other arguments in this section of the dialogue (e.g.
in the argument at 131a-c, where Parmenides substitutes an analogy of a sail for
Socrates' more appropriate analogy between the Forms and day), it is perfectly
possible that Parmenides is trading on the implicit ambiguity in the term
"paradeigma" and substituting the notion of "exemplar" for Socrates' intended
sense of "pattern". Thus, in the interest of neutrality, it would seem that we ought
to regard this passage as providing objective support for neither of our alternatives.
In the Theaetetus, Socrates says that "paradeigmata" are set up in reality of
most blessed divinity and most wretched godlessness; but the context is too brief for
us to determine from it whether "pattern" or "exemplar" is the intended sense of
the word. On the other hand, Euthyphro 6e, which I have discussed above, clearly
demands the translation "pattern" rather than "example".
This seems to be the case also at Republic V, 472c. "It was for the sake of a
paradeigma, then, that we were seeking the nature of Justice itself", Socrates states.
He explicitly rules out the aim of demonstrating that either the Form of Justice itself
or the ideally just man could come into existence (472d). Just as a painter who had
portrayed the ideally beautiful man could not be criticized on the grounds that his
painting was not, and could J not be, a portrait of any individual, the philosopher
who describes in words the ideals of Justice cannot be faulted if it turns out that they
are not fully realizable (472d-e).
The passage indicates that the account of Justice in the Republic is not a
description of some perfect example of the virtue, but of a standard, an ideal, in
terms of which all instances of the virtue are to be judged. Had Plato intended the
Form of Justice to be a perfect exemplar of itself, he could have responded to the
problem he is dealing with, the problem of the existence or realization of the just
state, by saying that, though it might not be possible to realize the Form perfectly in
this world of Becoming, still it was realized in the eternal world of the Forms. Yet
this is not his point; indeed, the passage trades for its sense on the contrast between
an ideal and some example or instance which approaches it. The contrast would be
undercut, and the sense lost, if we assumed that Plato meant "exemplar" when he
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called the Form a "paradeigma". If the translation is "pattern", however, the
passage makes perfect sense.
The other passages in the Republic are less clear than this one, but they are at
least compatible with the interpretation of "paradeigma" as "pattern". Book VI,
500e, simply echoes the point made in 472c. The point is similar also in Book IX, at
592b, where Socrates refers to a "paradeigma" of the just city being laid up in
heaven. True, he speaks of this "paradeigma" as being the real city of the just man,
but this is surely metaphor. He is not providing an extra-terrestrial locale for his
ideal city, in lieu of an earthly one; the point of the passage is simply that the pattern
exists for the just man to imitate in his life on earth.
Finally, in Book VII, at 54Oa, the philosophers of the just city are to use the
Form of the Good as a "paradeigma" for ordering their state, its citizens, and
themselves. The passages recalls Protagoras 326c (cf. above, P. 36, where the laws
were said to serve as patterns; however, there is no conclusive proof in the text of the
passage that Plato intended this interpretation rather than the exemplar one. There
are philosophical grounds, however, for preferring "pattern" to "exemplar" here.
These are simply that, since "good" itself is a very abstract term, an abstract object
like a pattern is more suitable as its referent than a concrete object such as an exemplar of goodness. Indeed, when Plato attempts to characterize the Good, at Rep.
VI, 505, he offers three very abstract and general possible accounts of its nature:
that it is pleasure, that it is knowledge, and that it is the beneficial. Two of these accounts are shown to be inadequate; however, they show that Plato was thinking of
the Good in abstract terms, rather than in terms of some particular example.
It is in the Timaeus that Plato most frequently exploits the concept of the Forms
as "paradeigmata". Here also, as in the Republic passage we have just discussed,
there is no conclusive textual evidence pertaining to the use of the term itself that
would rule out one interpretation or another. There is, however, both philosophical
and textual evidence that Plato is not thinking of his paradigm forms as exemplars
or models, but as patterns.
The evidence concerns the Form of Living Being (~0ov), from which the
Demiurge creates the visible world (3Oc-d). If paradigm Forms are exemplars, the
Form of Living Being would have to be a living being, and the consequences of this
would be catastrophic for Platonic metaphysics:
he would have absolutely nothing to gain by so thinking of the
Form of Animal - it would advance none of the stated purposes
for which he postulates the existence of Forms; on the contrary, it
would defeat disastrously the chief among them, which is to provide the Creator with an eternal, immutable model; for Plato
thinks of all living things as moving, and if the Form of Animal
were (an) animal the result would be a contradiction - that which
by hypothesis cannot move moves. And the contradiction would be
such an obvious one that he could hardly miss it. ' 4
This point applies not only to the property of mobility, which all animals have,
but to the related properties of being generable and destructible, being sensible, and
being material. Plato insists in the Timaeus that everything in the phenomenal world
has these properties, but that the Forms do not: they are eternal, unchanging, intelligible, and immaterial (27d-29a; cf. 52a-c). Thus, treating the Form as an exemplar of itself is contradictory to Plato's own account of the nature of the Forms.
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A proponent of the exemplar view could argue that this is in itself no proof that
Plato did not, contrary to all logic, think of the Form of Living Being as a living being. We may reply that, as there is no proof that he did, we should be justified in
preferring the interpretation of "paradeigma" as "pattern" to that of "exemplar"
simply on the grounds that it makes better philosophical sense of the text. There is
textual evidence, however, that further supports the view I have been defending.
First, Plato states that all of the various species of living being are contained in
the Form of Living Being, that it embraces or comprehends them (31a). As Vlastos
notes:
He says that the four kinds "are in" the ideal Living Creature ....
Plato says that F "is in" x, not the converse, to express the notion
that x is characterized by F. So if he had wanted to assert so
perverse a proposition as that the Form, Land-Animal, is
characterizable as a living creature, he would have said that Living
Creature is "in" Land-Animal, not vice-versa."
In addition, a distinction Plato draws within the Timaeus itself argues against
his treatment of Forms as instances of properties. At 48e ff., he amends his previous
classification of things into the two categories of Being and Becoming by adding a
third category, the Receptacle. This new category, which he identifies with space at
52a-b, enables him to explain in a novel way the difference between Being and
Becoming, Forms and phenomena. Phenomena owe their nature to the Forms of
which they are images, and their existence to the Receptacle in which they appear.
They are thus doubly dependent entities (52c). Forms, on the other hand, are completely independent entities, requiring no medium in which to exist; they never
receive anything into themselves from elsewhere, nor themselves go out into
anything else (5le-52a; cf. 52c-d). Being independent of any medium, they do not
exist in space (52b-d).
The Forms are thus described as independently existing, non-spatial entities. In
terms of the exemplar interpretation of the Forms, such a description makes no
sense. An exemplification of a property requires something in which it is exemplified. In the case of sensible properties, the natural medium would be space;
and even if we admit that Forms are not in physical space, we would seem to be
bound to posit an analogous medium, such as the "intelligible place" of the
Republic (VI, 508c, 509d; VII, 517b). The Timaeus denies that Forms exist in any
medium, however; the distinction between Forms and phenomena it draws is not
that between eternal, perfect instance and temporal, imperfect one (as the exemplar
view would have it), but the distinction between an abstract object such as a general
pattern and any of its instances.

III
I have argued above that the translation of "paradeigma" as "pattern" is compatible with the sense of all of the passages where the word is used in connection with the
Theory of Forms, and that this translation, rather than "exemplar", is indeed the
only one that makes sense in some of these passages. I have noted some of the ways
in which this interpretation is superior to the exemplar view as an interpretation of
Plato's own expressed metaphysical convictions; in this concluding section, I shall
comment briefly on these and other considerations which lead me to believe that the
treatment of paradigm Forms as patterns is decisively superior to the treatment of
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them as models or exemplars.
As we saw in section I, the exemplar view cannot make sense of the nature of
some of Plato's more abstract Forms. Since patterns are abstract objects, however,
the same problems do not arise for them. We are accustomed, it is true, to think of
"patterns" as abstract representations of spatial designs (e.g. dress patterns, designs
on tile, etc.) but there is no intrinsic limitation in the concept of pattern which would
prevent even abstract ideas such as being and unity from being thought of as
patterns.
Since patterns are not, in general, instances of themselves, the possibility of a
regress argument such as the Third Man does not arise on this interpretation, as it
does for the exemplar view. Nor need we be troubled by Plato's strictures against
definition by example, or by his ascription to the Forms of some inherent generality:
patterns are not examples, and they are inherently general. Also, if we adopt the
view that Forms are patterns, we need postulate no radical change in Plato's thought
as a result of the arguments in the Parmenides.
Admittedly, the exemplar view had the advantages of offering a simple interpretation of self-predication, the resemblance of Forms and phenomena, and the
causal role of the Forms. Each of these advantages turns out on reflection however,
to be more apparent than real. In the first place, it is faint praise to say of an interpretation of Plato's metaphysics that it makes possible a literal interpretation of
Plato's self-predicative statements, since it is the literal interpretation which gives
rise to the Third Man Argument and the charge of incoherence. The view I have offered in lieu of the exemplar view is incompatible with such a literal reading of selfpredication, but compatible with the alternatives mentioned in n. 4. As these interpretations avoid the problems associated with the literal interpretation, this seems
actually to be a point in my favour.
The exemplar view can explain the resemblance between Forms and phenomena
by claiming that the Form shares its property with its participants. This interpretation fits nicely with the way we use the term "resemblance", but Plato seems to have
had a somewhat wider notion of resemblance. At Tim. 38c he states that the cosmos
is like the Form after which it is made, because it exists throughout all time, whereas
the Form is eternal. Yet time itself is an image of eternity, being in perpetual motion
whereas eternity is utterly without change (37d). As in this case the resemblance is
not based on having a property in common, we should not assume without argument
that it is so based in other cases (e.g. the resemblance between the Form of Living
Being and the cosmos, or between the Form of Equality in the Phaedo and equal
things).
The exemplar view assumes that the Forms are causes in the way that the sun is
a cause of heat: by imparting that which it has pre-eminently to other things. On this
account, the Forms would be efficient causes; yet this explanation is difficult to
reconcile with the separation of the Forms from the physical world, on which Plato
continues to insist even in the Timaeus (51e-52a) and Sophist (the exclusion of the
Forms from motion and change at 249b is an exclusion of them from the
phenomenal world). There are, moreover, other ways in which things may be causes;
they may be formal or final causes, for instance. Vlastos has argued that the Forms
in the Phaedo are "logical aitiai," a conception that is closer to the notion of a formal cause than to any other. 16 It seems fair to assume that the paradigmatic function
of the Forms is at least akin to their performing the task of Aristotelian final causes,
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and this seems to be their role in the teleological cosmology of the Timaeus, where
the role of efficient cause is taken over by the Demiurge (28c). Patterns, though they
could not be efficient causes, seem suited to the roles of formal and final causes;
thus, there is no reason why Forms cannot be causes on my view as well as on the
exemplar view.
I see no reason, therefore, why the interpretation of the Forms as abstract patterns is not to be preferred to the exemplar view. The latter view has worked its
mischief in the interpretation of Plato for more than a quarter of a century; it is time
for it to be replaced by another, which offers a better opportunity for a clear view of
Plato's metaphysics. 11
William J. Prior,
University of Colorado, Boulder.
Notes

I.

Numerous scholars have held that Forms are exemplars, for one or both of the reasons cited below.
Among them are: R.E. Allen, in Plato's 'Euthyphro' and the Earlier Theory of Forms (London,
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), p.154; Donald Brownstein, in Aspects of the Problem of Universals
(Lawrence, University of Kansas, 1973), ch. IV; R.C. Cross and A.D. Woozley, in Plato's Republic:
A Philosophical Commentary (New York, St. Martin's, 1966) p.181; P.T. Geach, in "The Third
Man Again", in R.E. Allen, ed., Studies in Plato's Metaphysics (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1965), pp.267-270, 276; G.E.L. Owen, in "The Place of the Timaeus in Plato's Dialogues", in
Allen, SPM, pp.318-322, esp. 320, n.4; in "A Proof in the 'Peri /dean"', in Allen, SPM, p.310;
and in "Dialectic and Eristic in the Treatment of the Forms", in Owen, ed., Aristotle on Dialectic:
The Topics, Proceedings of the Third Symposium Aristotelicum (Oxford, Clarendon, 1970),
pp. I 16-118, 121, 123; Colin Strang, in "Plato and the Third Man", in Gregory Vlastos, ed., Plato
I: Metaphysics and Epistemology (Garden City, Doubleday, 1971), pp.187-192; and Vlastos, in
"The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides", in Allen, SPM, pp.244-25 I. Vlastos' current position (cf. n.4, below) is different from that of the 1954 article.
Strang makes a distinction quite similar to the one I draw between "exemplar" and "pattern";
nonetheless, he attributes to Plato the view that Forms are exemplars. Allen's view that the Forms
are exemplars is at odds with his account of the nature of the Forms in "Participation and Predication in Plato's Middle dialogues", in Allen, SPM, pp.43-60; cf. esp. pp.43-47. Perhaps he does not
mean what I do by "exemplar" in the passage cited above.

2.

Like Vlastos, in "The Unity of the Virtues in the Protagoras", in Vlastos, Platonic Studies
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, I 973) p.258, n.97, I shall use the term "self-predication"
not for all statements of the grammatical form, "F-ness is F" or "The Form of Fis F', but only for
those instances of that schema which actually attribute the property of being F to the Form itself.

3.

In large part, this interpretation owes its popularity to Wittgenstein, as Geach reports in "The Third
Man Again", p.267; cf. also R.S. Bluck, "Forms as Standards", Phronesis 2 (1957), p.115.

4.

For alternatives to the straightforward account of self-predication associated with the exemplar
view, cf. Allen, "Participation and Predication", pp.46-47; H.F. Cherniss, "The Relation _ofthe
Timaeus to Plato's Later Dialogues", in Allen, SPM, pp.369-374; Vlastos, "The Unity of the Virtues", pp.259-264; and Alexander Nehamas, "Self-Predication and Plato's Theory of Forms",
American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979), pp.93-103.

5.

This may be the basis for Aristotle's remark at Metaphysics M. 9, 1086a32-34 that the Platonists
treat the Forms as both universals and particulars.

6.
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